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CONFLICT oF LAWS-APPLICATION OF EsTOPPEL To INVALID DIVORCES-MEXICAN "MAIL ORDER" DIVORCE-Plaintiff and defendant, who wished to
marry, persuaded defendant's wife to agree to a Mexican "mail order" divorce.
The spouses executed and delivered powers of attorney to counsel residing in
Mexico, where a divorce was granted and the decree mailed back to New York.
Neither of the parties went to 1\1:exico, nor did the decree of the Mexican court
recite presence or domicile of either spouse. Upon learning that the decree had
been granted, plaintiff and defendant were married in Virginia and then returned
to New York, their state of domicile. In I 946, the plaintiff commenced this action,
asking for separation and support, alleging that she was duly married to the
defendant and that he had abandoned her. The trial court found for the plaintiff,
and this judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Division on the ground that
the defendant was estopped to impeach the divorce decree obtained by him in the
foreign jurisdiction.1 On further appeal, held, reversed. Inasmuch as there was no
"color of jurisdiction" to support the Mexican decree, neither party having
appeared in the proceeding, defendant was not estopped to show its invalidity.
_Caldwell v. Caldwell, (N.Y. I948) 8I N.E. (2d) 60.
It is well settled that a party must be domiciled within the jurisdiction- before
a court will be said to have the authority necessary to grant a divorce which will

1

272 App. Div. (N.Y.) 1025, 73 N.Y.S. (2d) 683 (1947).
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be recognized in other jurisdictions.2 To avoid harsh results which might otherwise occur, however, several states invoke another rule whereby a participant in
an invalid proceeding is estopped to assert the infirmity of the decree. 3 Thus it
has been held that when a wife, knowing her husband was not a resident of the
foreign jurisdiction, appeared in the foreign action and admitted her husband's
alleged residence, she could not later claim dower in his estate on the ground of
invalidity of the divorce, although the decree was in fact void. 4 Also, when both
parties appear in the foreign jurisdiction, the party who obtains the decree cannot
thereafter impeach it in another state in order to bring an action of alienation of
affection, 5 or in order to share in the estate of the other party to the prior divorce
proceedings. 6 Although one of the parties does nothing to obtain the invalid
decree, the rule will apply if he takes advantage of the decree by remarrying, the
policy here apparently being that the estoppel should be invoked to protect the
second wife.7 The estoppel doctrine was carried to its utmost limits in one case
where the wife returned after a three year absence and asserted she had obtained
a divorce; she was held to be estopped later to deny the existence of a decree
although it appeared that there had been none. 8 The courts of New York, following
the general policy of estoppel illustrated by the foregoing examples, often have
refused to allow a party to assert the invalidity of a foreign decree.1l On the other
hand, the principal case indicates the distinction which has been made in the
case of a "mail order" divorce, wherein neither spouse was within the jurisdiction
2

1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 116 (1935); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226, 65 S.Ct. 1092 (1945); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 21 S.Ct. 551 (1901).
8
Jacobs, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 M1cH. L. REV. 749 at 769 (1936):
"What the courts really mean ••• is that, due to the circumstances of the particular case,
it would be both unfair and inequitable for the party obtaining the divorce to attack it
•••• By the divorce his election has been made." See also Dorby, "Obligation of Invalid
Divorce on Person Who Induced It and Married Party Procuring It," 12 N.Y. UNiv.
L.Q. 31, 39 (1934).
4
Ferry v. Troy Laundry Co., (D.C. Ore. 1917) 238 F. 867.
5
Bledsoe v. Seaman, 77 Kan. 679, 95 P. 576 (1908).
6
Dale v. Carson, 141 Okl. 105, 283 P. (2d) 1017 (1929); Chapman v. Chapman,
224 Mass. 427, 113 N.E. 359 (1916).
1
Cummings v. Huddleston Adm., 99 Okl. 195, 226 P. 104 (1924); Marvin v.
Foster, 61 Minn. 154, 63 N.W. 484 (1895). The same result was reached where
the estopped party did not know of the invalidity of the prior divorce at the time of the
second marriage. See Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colo. 147, 25 P. 81 (1890).
8
Edgar v. Richardson, 33 Ohio St. 581 (1878).
9
Lacy v. Lacy, 38 Misc. 196, 77 N.Y.S. 235 (1902); Starbuck v. Starbuck, 173
N.Y. 503, 66N.E. 193 (1903); Shradyv. Shrady,47 Misc. 333, 95 N.Y.S. 991 (1905);
Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N.Y.S. 566 (1917). See particularly
Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355 at 359, 26 N.E. (2d) 290 (1940), "To refuse to
permit this defendant to escape his obligations to support plaintiff does not mean that
the courts of this State recognize as valid a judgment of divorce which necessarily is
assumed to be invalid in the case at bar, but only that it is not open to defendant in these
proceedings to avoid the responsibility which he voluntarily incurred." This language
was the basis of the lower court's decision in the principal case.
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of the court entertaining the divorce proceeding.10 Though the distinction is here
couched in terms of a lack of "color of jurisdiction" in the foreign court, this
seems merely a misleading way of stating that there is a point beyond which the
New York policy prohibits recognition of invalid decrees.11
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10 Vose v. Vose, 280 N.Y. 779, 21 N.E. (2d) 616 (1939); Querze v. Querze; 290
N.Y. 13, 47 N.E. (2d) 423 (1943).
11 Other states refuse to recognize the "mail order divorce" on the grounds of
public policy. Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 68 P. (2d) 928 (1937); Kegley v.
Kegley, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 216, 60 P. (2d) 482 (1936); Bergman v. Bergman, 287
Mass. 524 at 529, 192 N.E. 86 (1934); "To recognize the Mexican divorce as valid in
the circumstances here disclosed would frustrate and make vain all state laws regulating
and limiting divorce. By such recognition state control over the marriage relation would
be destroyed."

